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Part I: Legislative aspects 
 
 
1 State obligation to introduce and maintain social security 
 
1.1 Social security as a fundamental social right  
 
The right to social security was incorporated in the Dutch Constitution as part of the 
Constitutional amendment of 1983, which provided for the inclusion of a number of other 
fundamental social rights dealing with legal aid, employment, employees’ rights, freedom 
of labour, environment, public health and education. The text of Article 20 is as follows: 
 
1. De bestaanszekerheid der bevolking en spreiding van de welvaart zijn voorwerp van zorg van de 
overheid.  
2. De wet stelt regels omtrent de aanspraken op sociale zekerheid.  
3. Nederlanders, hier te lande, die niet in het bestaan kunnen voorzien, hebben een bij wet te regelen 




1. It shall be the concern of the authorities to secure the means of subsistence of the population and 
to achieve the distribution of wealth. 
2. Rules concerning entitlement to social security shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. 
3. Dutch nationals resident in the Netherlands who are unable to provide for themselves shall have a 
right, to be regulated by Act of Parliament, to public assistance. 
 
The inclusion of the fundamental social rights in the Constitution in 1983 was preceded 
by intense debate with regard to the need for and the effect of these rights. It must 
nevertheless be borne in mind that recognition of the right to social security was not a 
new phenomenon in the Dutch legal order. After all, the right is also enshrined in a 
number of international instruments by which the Netherlands is bound, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 22; the right to social security), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 9; the right to 
social security, including social insurance) and the European Social Charter (Art. 12; 
ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social security). 
 
Much has been written about the content and legal effect of Article 20 of the Constitution 
and other fundamental social rights. There is a wide range of opinions, some minimalist, 
some more generous. The minimum view is represented by Burkens, who associates 
fundamental social rights with ‘amorphous policy guidelines whose legal effect roams in 
the dark’.1 Another representative of this conservative viewpoint is Kortmann, who 
remarks in his handbook of constitutional law that fundamental social rights do not really 
constitute an element of the rechtstaat (a state based upon the principle of the rule of 
law).2 In his view, this can only be the case when these rights contribute towards the 
                                                 
1
 Cited in a study of the Social and Economic Council, Verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling sociale zekerheid, 
Den Haag: SER 1994, p. 172. 
2
 C.A.J.M Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht, Deventer, 1997, pp. 355-366. 
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realisation of fundamental freedoms. In a society where people are hungry the exercise of 
these freedoms may be endangered and in these circumstances social security 
programmes might be necessary. But even then, it can be questioned whether the state 
should be responsible for maintaining them. By preference, responsibility for such 
programmes should be borne by the community.  
 
A proponent of the generous view of the effect of the right to social security is, for 
example, Vlemminx, who distinguishes between various types of state obligations under 
the headings of ‘abstention’, ‘insurance’, ‘policy’ and ‘protection’.3 In his view, the 
formulation of some (international) fundamental social rights implies that individuals 
without resources should be entitled to concrete support.  
 
In the jungle of opposing views on Article 20 of the Constitution it is only possible to 
distil consensus regarding what it does not include. Two aspects are worth mentioning. In 
the first place, Article 20 does not include a clear material concept of social security, let 
alone a standard for the level of the benefits. In other words, it does not say what social 
security is or what social security model should be adopted. Consequently, the only 
possible conclusion is that social security is what the majority of people think it is at a 
given point in time. Secondly, Article 20 does not prescribe a specific division of powers 
between the state, society at large and the individual. Though this observation is perhaps 
less true of the third paragraph, dealing with the right to social assistance, certainly the 
second paragraph sheds no light on the ideal division of powers. It has been argued that 
Article 20 rules out total state abstinence as regards social security, as if it excludes the 
possibility of a nineteenth century liberal state.4 This may be true, but the fact remains 
that the article does not contain any suggestion that the state should organise or 
administer social security itself. On the contrary, it is frequently suggested that it is not 
the state, but rather society as a whole that should take primary responsibility for this, as 
classic fundamental rights tend rather to restrict the possibility of state interference. From 
this point of view it is more plausible to interpret Article 20 as implying that the right to 
social security could also be implemented by means of contractual rights and obligations 
between citizens and private parties.5 
 
In the light of the vagueness of Article 20, it is understandable that it has not served as a 
concrete point of reference for testing the legitimacy or constitutionality of measures in 
the field of social security. However this does not mean that Article 20 has been 
altogether without influence. In the mid-1990s the government introduced plans to 
replace the existing sickness benefits scheme by a scheme requiring employers to 
continue wage payments during periods of sickness (then for a maximum period of one 
year). The operation is often referred to as the privatisation of the Ziektewet (Sickness 
Benefits Act). In its official advice to the government, the Council of State urged the 
government to have regard to the principles of Article 20 of the Constitution. This was 
the first time that the fundamental right to social security was invoked to judge the 
validity of changes to the system. According to the Council of State the government had 
                                                 
3
 F. Vlemminx, Een nieuw profiel van grondrechten, Deventer, 1998. 
4
 W.J.P.M. Fase, ‘Sociale grondrechten in de grondwet’, NJCM-bulletin 1983, pp. 208-211. 
5
 D. Pieters, Sociale grondrechten op prestaties, Antwerpen, 1985, pp. 448-449. 
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to make it clear how the privatisation proposals were capable of striking a balance 
between solidarity on the one hand and personal initiative and individual responsibility 
on the other. The government responded by proposing that a privatised social security 
system is not contrary to Article 20 as long as it operates within a legislative framework 
which is capable of inhibiting negative market forces and guarantees the rights of 
employees. The government referred to this as the ‘social conditioning’ of privatisation. 
The government formulated the following requirements on the basis of Article 20: 
 
The obligation of all employees to insure themselves against the major social risks and the right of 
employers to take insurance against these risks, which should apply without selection and which 
should be affordable. The rights of employees in case of bankruptcy must be secured and extra 
attention should be paid to the position of chronically sick employees and small enterprises.6 
 
In this way, the government inferred a duty from Article 20 to interfere in situations in 
which the market no longer satisfied the objectives of social security and was able to 
establish concrete criteria for it. In the end the sickness benefits scheme was kept as a 
safety net. Furthermore, the right to continued wage payments for workers was embedded 
in the Civil Code. In order to avoid adverse risk selection, employers are no longer 
allowed to conduct medical tests before hiring employees. A legislative and 
infrastructural framework, referred to as the ‘gatekeeper model’, has been set up to 
ensure that sick unemployed persons are rapidly reintegrated into the labour market 
instead of becoming dependant on long term invalidity benefit.7  
 
Much debate is possible regarding the need for and necessity of the privatisation of the 
sickness benefits scheme, but the secondary measures which accompanied the operation 
have made it harder to argue that it was unconstitutional. Nonetheless the measures in the 
field of sickness benefits have attracted a good deal of criticism and suspicion from the 
supervisory committees of the European Social Charter, the European Code on Social 
Security and ILO Conventions. In 1998 the Committee of Independent Experts of the 
ESC concluded that the operation was contrary to Article 12(3) of the Charter, which 
obliges the state to progressively raise the levels of social protection.8 According to the 
Committee, privatisation undermines the principle of solidarity, as it does not allow for 
the spreading of risk. The Dutch government has actively tried to refute this point of 
view, to some extent successfully: instead of rejecting the privatisation measures out of 
hand, the supervisory authorities now phrase their criticism more carefully. The present 
position of both the European Committee for social rights and the ILO Committee of 
Experts9 is that, although the developments in the Netherlands are not necessarily 
contrary to fundamental standards, they should be monitored intensively in view of the 
incidence of possible negative side effects.10  
                                                 
6
 Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 439, nr. 3, 5. 
7
 Cf. B. Barentsen and J.M..Fleuren-Van Walsum, Wet verbetering poortwachter, Deventer, 2002. 
8
 Committee of Independent Experts, observations 1992-1996. Council of Europe, 1998. 
9  De last conclusions of the  European  Committee of social rights with regard to the Netherlands are 
contained in 2006, XVIII (1). For the conclusions of the ILO-Committee of Experts see CEACR, 
documentnummer 062003NLD102. 
10
 For a critical discussion see M.J.A.C. Driessen, ‘Privatisering van sociale zekerheid en 
internationaalrechtelijke grenzen’, in: S. Klosse (ed.), Arbeid en Gezondheid. Schipperen tussen 
verantwoordelijkheid en bescherming, Maastricht, 2006, pp.209-221. 
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1.2 Impact of international law  
 
The fundamental right to social security as enshrined in international law has not 
attracted much attention in parliamentary discussions or in judicial decisions. With the 
completion of the national social security system the primary reference point for 
discussion and for the settlement of disputes was no longer the fundamental right to 
social security but rather the various acts of parliament. As far as the Dutch courts are 
concerned: they have always refrained from complex mind exercises regarding the 
possible implications of the fundamental right. It is still their opinion that the right to 
social security does not qualify as a self-executing provision within the meaning of the 
Dutch Constitution,11 and in the Dutch constitutional context only these types of 
provision are capable of invalidating conflicting national legislation.12  
 
Many contemporary scholarly essays argue in favour of a stronger role for fundamental 
social rights.13 It has been argued that the lack of attention given to the right to social 
security is undeserved as it fails to take into account a number of developments, such as: 
 
- the collapse of consensus with regard to the ultimate rationale (rechtsgrond) of 
social security; 
- the gradual dilution of the entitlement to benefit as an individual right, resulting 
from the growing importance of discretionary powers, in particular in social 
assistance legislation; 
- the increasing international acknowledgement of the right to social security as a 
universal right.14 
 
It remains to be seen whether the trend in legal thinking will be echoed by judicial 
decisions. There may be indirect signs that point in this direction. In general terms 
fundamental rights increasingly make themselves felt in social security case law.15 What 
is more, the highest court for social security matters, the Centrale Raad van Beroep 
(Central Appeals Court; CRvB) is increasingly showing a willingness to apply the 
                                                 
11
 For an overview of the relevant case law, see Frank Vlemminx, ‘The Netherlands and the ICECR, why 
didst thou promise such a beauteous day’ in: Fons Coomans (ed.), Justiciability of economic and social 
rights: experiences from domestic systems, Antwerpen/Oxford, 2006, 43-66. 
12
 Art. 94 of the Constitution provides that ‘Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be 
applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of decisions by international 
organizations under public international law, which can bind everyone’. 
13
 Cf. Klara Boonstra, Fundamenten voor een sociaal Europa, oration Vrije Universiteit, 2003; Saskia 
Klosse, Moderne sociale zekerheid: efficiency met behoud van fundamentele waarden, oration Universiteit 
van Maastricht, 2003.  The most outspoken rallying call for the right to social security is contained in G.J. 
Vonk, Recht op sociale zekerheid, van identiteitscrisis naar hernieuwd zelfvertrouwen, oration Groningen, 
2008 
14
 Cf. Gijsbert Vonk, ‘An individual complaints procedure for fundamental socio economic rights, some 
remarks from the perspective of the right to social security in the Netherlands’ Griffin’s View, 2007, 93-99. 
15
 F.J.L. Pennings, Monografieën Sociaal Recht, Nederlands Socialezekerheidsrecht in een internationale 
context, Tilburg, Utrecht, Kluwer uitgave 2004; GJ. Vonk, Overijverige rechter of tekortschietende 
wetgever, de rol van rechter en wetgever bij het proces van doorwerking van internationale normen in het 
socialezekerheidsrecht, oration Vrije Universiteit, 1999.  
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minimum standards conventions of the ILO and the Council of Europe.16 For a long time 
the Centrale Raad van Beroep ruled that minimum standard conventions could not be 
relied upon in individual cases in view of their programmatic character and the vagueness 
of the rules. A change was announced in a judgment of 29 May 1996.17 This case 
concerned the question whether it was in line with ILO Conventions Nos. 102 and 103 to 
charge the insured persons a financial contribution for hospital maternity care. The Court 
ruled that:  
 
The descriptions of the benefits to be paid, as well as the imperative wording of the provisions in 
relation to the minimal character of both the Convention in general and of these provisions in 
particular, mean that they are suitable to be invoked by the persons protected with a view to testing 
rights granted under national law against the standards of the Convention and therefore, within this 
meaning, one can speak of convention provisions that are self-executing as regards content within the 
meaning of Article 93 of the Dutch Constitution. 
 
Imposing a financial contribution for hospital maternity care was held to be unlawful. As 
a matter of fact, at the time of the proceedings the government had abolished this kind of 
contribution anyway.  
 
Since the maternity leave judgment, ILO Conventions have frequently been invoked, but 
to no avail. This led to the suggestion that the judgment was something of a red herring. 
But recently, in a case which again concerned the charging of a financial contribution 
(but this time for hospital care resulting from an industrial injury) the Centrale Raad van 
Beroep repeated its earlier judgment.18 The relevant provision of part VI of the European 
Code on Social Security was to be applied directly. The result was that the national 
legislation had to give way for the minimum standard involved. This time there were no 
government intentions to abolish the financial contribution spontaneously. 
 
The change in attitudes towards international minimum standards on social security could 
possibly work as a lever with which to open the door to some form of applicability of the 
right to social security. However, as yet this door remains firmly bolted. In a recent, 
crucial test case involving the exclusion of illegal children from entitlement to emergency 
assistance under the Wet werk en bijstand (Work and Social Assistance Act; WWB), the 
Centrale Raad van Beroep sang the old song and bluntly stated that Article 27 of the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child (adequate standard of living)19 is not 
a self-executing provision within the meaning of the Constitution.20  
 
                                                 
16
 The development of the relevant case law has been documented by Frans Pennings in his oration for 
Tilburg University in 2004. F.J.L. Pennings, De betekenis van internationale normen voor de Nederlandse 
sociale zekerheid, oration Tilburg University, 2004. 
17
 RSV 1998/9, annotation by F. Vlemminx. 
18
 CRvB 8 september 2006. 
19
 The right to social security adopted in Art. 26 ICRC could not be invoked in view of a Netherlands 
reservation made by this article. 
20
 CRvB 24 januari 2006, RSV 2006, 84 annotation G.J. Vonk. The confirmation that Art. 27 ICRC is not 
self-executing came in CRvB 9 oktober 2006, RSV 2006, 369. For a critical analysis, see G.J. Vonk, 
‘Ongewenste kinderen; opmerkingen naar aanleiding van CRvB 24 januari 2006’, SMA 2006, pp. 131-134.  
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2 The legal duty to respect the position of the individual 
 
2.1 Constitutional protection of acquired rights and vested interests 
 
The right to property in included in art. 14 of the Constitution. The text of this article 
reads: 
 
1. Expropriation may take place only in the public interest and on prior assurance of full 
compensation, in accordance with regulations laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament. 
2. Prior assurance of full compensation shall not be required if in an emergency immediate 
expropriation is called for. 
3.  In the cases laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament there shall be a right to full or partial 
compensation if in the public interest the competent authority destroys property or renders it 
unusable or restricts the exercise of the owner’s rights to it. 
 
Curiously, in Dutch legal doctrine and case law, the right to property is not associated  
with social security and changing benefit rights. In public law the protection of rights 
which the individual derives from the existing state of the law is much rather approached 
from the perspective of the principle of legal certainty  (rechtszekerheidsbeginsel). The 
Constitution does not include a explicit reference to this principle. It merely contains a 
probibition of legislation with retroactive effect in the area of criminal law. Thus article 
16 of the Constitution prescribes that no offence shall be punishable unless it was an 
offence under the law at the time it was committed. In other areas than criminal law, the 
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (the Supreme Court of the Netherlands; HR) has accepted 
the principle of legal certainty as an unwritten principle of law. This implies that the 
courts can test all legislation (except acts of parliament) and decisions of public 
authorities against this principle.21 Indeed, the Courts have a long-standing tradition in 
this respect.22 Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the principle of legal certainty 
has been invoked against subordinate legislation which adversely affects the vested 
interests of individuals. Similarly, these days the administrative courts, including the 
Centrale Raad van Beroep, do not hesitate to apply the principle of legal certainty.23  
 
Despite the above, the Dutch constitutional rule that acts of parliament are inviolable 
implies that courts may not call the validity of such acts into question, unless the acts are 
contrary to self-executing provisions of international law. This implies that the courts 
have no power to judge whether acts of parliament (as opposed to subordinate legislation) 
have infringed the principle of legal certainty. This was explicitly stressed by the Hoge 
Raad in a judgment in 1989,24 in a case initiated against the Dutch state by the national 
student union following legislative changes that limited the possibilities for students to 
obtain grants. The changes blatantly violated students’ expectations based on the old 
legislation and no provision was made for transitional arrangements to accommodate 
these expectations. In its judgment the Hoge Raad went out of its way to point out in 
what circumstances the principle of legal certainty might be relied upon by the courts, but 
                                                 
21
 HR 16 mei 1986, NJ 1987, 251 (landbouwvliegersarrest). 
22
 CRvB 31 juni 1935, ARB 1936, 168. 
23
 For an example, see CRvB 11 december 1980, AB 1981, 200 annotation by Van der Net (retro-active 
effect health cost regulation). 
24
 Referred to as the Harmonisatiewet judgment, HR 14 april 1989, AB 1989, 207. 
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eventually reaffirmed that when it comes to the formal question of testing the validity of 
acts of parliament, the courts must remain silent.  
 
This judgment was based on the assumption that the principle of legal certainty was not 
embedded in any international legal obligation. In retrospect, it may be questioned 
whether this assumption was correct. It could very well be argued that the principle of 
legal certainty constitutes an element of the right to property as referred to in Article 1 of 
the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Admittedly it is 
only since the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Gaygusuz25 that it has 
become clear that Article1 of the First Protocol may have these implications specifically 
for legislation in the area of social benefits. Indeed, the courts now fully accept the 
implications of Article 1 of the First Protocol for the protection of acquired rights and 
vested interests under the social security laws (see section 2.2 below). The Gaygusuz 
judgment has truly caused a change in Dutch legal theory.26 
 
 
2.2 Social security case law 
 
Even though the courts may not constitutionally judge changes in acts of parliament in 
the light of the principle of legal certainty, the Centrale Raad van Beroep has 
circumvented this difficulty by approaching such cases from the viewpoint of non-
discrimination. This road was opened after the Centrale Raad van Beroep decided in 
1983 that Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has direct 
effect in the Dutch legal order, also in matters of social security.27 The reasoning behind 
applying the non-discrimination principle is usually that there is a lack of objective 
justification for treating the existing rights of existing beneficiaries in the same way as 
the rights of persons who acquire benefits after legislative changes have been 
implemented. A good example of how the Centrale Raad van Beroep has applied this 
technique deals with the introduction of the so-called Linkage Act in 1998.28 Under the 
Act, persons who are illegally resident in the Netherlands are no longer entitled to 
benefits. The Act was given immediate effect, so existing beneficiaries were also affected 
by it. In 2001, in a case concerning child benefit, the Centrale Raad van Beroep accepted 
that the Act did not constitute discrimination on grounds of nationality as it serves a 
justified purpose, namely preventing social security entitlement from having an 
encouraging effect on the stay of persons residing illegally in the Netherlands. However, 
the Centrale Raad van Beroep made an exception for those who were already receiving 
child benefit. According to the Centrale Raad van Beroep, the consequences of illegal 
residence for child benefit entitlement in the Netherlands had already materialised for this 
                                                 
25
 Gaygusuz v Austria, ECHR RJ&D 1996-IV, no. 14, 1129-1157. 
26
 Cf. G.J.Vonk, ‘Social security and the right to property: Gaygusuz and after’, in: Jan Peter Loof, Hendrik 
Ploeger & Arine van der Steur (eds.), The right to property, the Influence of Article 1 protocol No. 1 ECHR on 
several fields of domestic law, E.M. Meijers Institute, Maastricht, 2000, pp. 145-155. 
27
 CRvB, 1 november 1983, RSV 1984, 147 t/m 150, annotation by W Μ Levelt-Overmars. 
28
 Stb. 1998, 2004. 
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group. In these circumstances, applying the linkage principle was no longer considered a 
suitable and proportionate instrument for realising the objectives of the Act.29  
 
Once the consequences of the Gaygusuz judgment had sunk in, the Centrale Raad van 
Beroep no longer fell back on the principle of non-discrimination when dealing with the 
quality of transitional arrangements accompanying legislative changes. Instead it has 
dealt with questions of acquired rights and vested interests directly under Article 1 of the 
First Protocol ECHR. This became apparent in a judgment of 18 June 200430 in which the 
Centrale Raad van Beroep ruled on the validity of an act that disentitled detainees from 
social security benefits. The act had entered into force on 1 May 2000. It disqualified not 
only future detainees from benefits, but also persons who were at that time already in 
detention (with an extension of rights for a period of only one month). The question of 
law was very similar to the one that arose in the Linkage Act case discussed above. The 
Centrale Raad van Beroep considered the extension period of one month to be too short, 
this time basing its argument on Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR. 
 
An important case dealing with changes in the legislative regime deals with the changes 
to the survivor benefit scheme of 1996. These changes, which included the introduction 
of a means test, were given immediate effect, albeit that some mitigation measures had 
been given more favourable treatment. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the introduction 
of the new Algemene nabestaandenwet (General Surviving Relatives Act; ANW), 
existing widowers could be confronted with a considerable loss of income. The Centrale 
Raad van Beroep found that the transitional regime was not contrary to Article 1 of the 
First Protocol ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights accepted this position in 
Goudswaard-van der Lans.31 The case concerned a widow whose survivor pension was 
substantially reduced on the ground that she was cohabiting with a man. Under the old 
legislation this was without consequences, but under the new legislation cohabitees are 
treated in the same way as married couples. The European Court took into consideration 
the fact that provision had been made to ease the effects of the new legislation on persons 
in the situation of the applicant. It accepted that the introduction of the new legislation 
had had effects on the applicant’s disposable income, but found that it did not place 
Contracting Parties under a positive obligation to support a given individual’s chosen 
lifestyle out of funds which were entrusted to them as agents of the public weal.  
 
A more comprehsensive test under Article 1 of the First Protocol was applied  by the 
Centrale Raad van Beroep more recently in a case dealing with changes in the 
unemployment benefit scheme in 2003.32  In this year the government abolished the so-
                                                 
29
 CRvB, 26 juni 2001, RSV 2001, 216, annotation by Francis Keunen. For a similar judgement in the area 
of social assistance: CRvB, 26 juni 2001, AB 2001, 277.  
30
 CRvB 18 juni 2004, AB 2004, 296. 
31
 Goudswaard-van der Lans v The Netherlands, ECHR 22 September 2005, No. 75255/01, AB 2006, 1. 
The case has been critically discussed by Frans Pennings ‘Eigendomsbescherming in de sociale zekerheid’ 
in: M. Herweijer, G.J. Vonk & W.A. Zondag (eds.),  Sociale Zekerheid voor het oog van de meester, 
opstellen voor prof. mr. F.M. Noordam, Deventer, 2006, 101-114.  
32
 CRvB 11 september 2007, 06/4760 WW, LJN: BB3760, RSV 2007/317, USZ 2007/312 
 
 
Met opmaak: Engels (V.S.)
 10
called follow-up benefit which was part of the unemployment benefit scheme.  The 
benefit was payable after expiration of the normal earnings related component of the 
unemployment benefit. The government was so much in a hurry to implement the 
changes in the scheme, that it did not want to await the formal entry into force of the new 
legislation. The abolition was made public by press announcement  In the subsequent 
legislative amendment the provisions dealing with the follow-up benefit were abolished.  
Simultaneously a transitional provision was introduced which allowed employees to 
remain entitled to follow-up benefit as far as they had become unemployed prior to the 
date of the government press announcement. According the the Centrale Raad van 
Beroep the operation did not violate Article 1 of the First Protocol. In particular the Court 
ruled that the interference with the right to property served a legitimate course, i.e. 
budgetary considerations in combination with the wish to improve the activating 
character of the umemployment benefit scheme. In view of the wide margin of 
appreciation of the state, the measure was deemed not be disproportional. The  fact that 
the  legislative change was given retroactive effect did not alter the situation. According 
to the Court there were three reasons for this. In the first place, the change did not merely 
effect a small number of employees as was the case in the famous Ásmundsson 
judgement of the ECHR which involved a very small group of beneficiaries who were 
adversaly affected by government measure.33 In the second place the Court attached 
relevance to the fact that the transitional regime was intended to avoid calculative 
behaviour on the part of the employers and employees  And finally, the Court took into 
account that the government had timely informed all employees of its intention to abolish 
the follow-up benefit. Under these circumstances the measured did not impose a 
disproportionate burden on the person involved. 
 
It must be concluded that, under the influence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Dutch courts are gradually embracing the right to property as a means of protecting 
acquired rights and vested interests. Case law is rapidly gaining maturity. Nonetheless, 
the state of the law is still a far cry from that in some other European countries, notably 
Germany, where the Bundesverfassungsgericht has a long tradition of applying the 
constitutionally enshrined principle of peaceful enjoyment of property in the field of 
social security benefits. 
3 Legal changes and transitional measures 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
 
The question as to what transitional arrangements should accompany legislative changes 
has been a subject of legal and political debate ever since major restructuring measures 
were introduced in the second half of the 1980s. Before this, no major cases can be 
reported in which the interests of insured persons or beneficiaries were affected, except to 
their advantage. However, since the Dutch reform process has focused on downscaling 
levels of protection, existing beneficiaries have frequently suffered disadvantage. The 
extent to which changes can impair the interests of existing beneficiaries became 
apparent when the Dutch legislature had to apply the principle of equality of treatment to 
                                                 
33
 ECRM 12 October 2004, zaak 60669/00 (Ásmundsson,  
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the Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet (General Disability Insurance Act; AAW) in 
the wake of the Third Equal Treatment Directive (79/7/EC). Married women were 
excluded from the scheme unless they were regarded as breadwinners. When this 
exclusion was abolished in 1985,34 a new condition was introduced requiring persons to 
have earned a certain amount of income in the year before the incapacity for work 
occurred. Initially, the government had made the inclusion of married women in the new 
income requirement applicable to new cases only. But after the Centrale Raad van 
Beroep had ruled in 1988 that this was contrary to the principle of equal treatment, new 
transitional measures had to be put into force. These made the income requirement 
applicable to existing beneficiaries as well, resulting in tens of thousands of persons 
losing their benefit entitlement. The transitional measures in the new AAW gave rise to a 
constant stream of legal complaints, some of which carried on right into the 1990s. 
Eventually the entire scheme was abolished, the only remnant being a non-contributory 
scheme for handicapped young persons (Wajong). Equality of treatment came at a high 
price. 
 
In 1995, an independent research foundation published a book on transitional law in the 
field of social security.35 The book, written under the chairmanship of the Groningen 
Professor F.M. Noordam, included contributions from a number of academics and judges, 
dealing with theoretical foundations, specific questions, case studies, etc. It has often 
been referred to in official publications as an authoritative source. In its general 
conclusions the publication argued that while the legislature can resort to various 
transitional measures, the basic principle should be to respect the rights of existing 
beneficiaries. It was argued that this followed from the very nature of social security, 
which is supposed to give citizens a secure material position. A choice has to be made 
between respecting the rights of existing beneficiaries fully (eerbiedigende werking) and 
postponing negative effects for a period of time, allowing beneficiaries to adjust to the 
new situation (uitgestelde werking). In the authors’ view, the latter is generally 
preferable.  
 
The SCOSZ publication challenged the official government view on transitional law in 
the social security field, which had been presented in a government statement to the 
Eerste Kamer (the upper house of parliament) on 29 March 1993. 36 In the statement the 
then social affairs minister had concluded that it was not possible to formulate a single 
simple rule for transitional law in the social security field, as each case should be 
considered on its own merits. The upper house and the Council of State were not satisfied 
with this view and requested the government to formulate a set of general rules. The 
response to this request was adopted in a letter to the upper house dated 19 November 
1999.37 The government refused to abandon its position:  
 
Transitional law, even in the area of social insurance should be tailored. In each case the 
transitional regime to be applied should be carefully considered and reasoned. The choice of 
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transitional measures depends on the nature of the social security legislation involved, on the 
objectives of the amendment (for example preventing abuse of rights, cutting down expense, 
increasing control), on the balance of the principle of legitimate expectations and the wish to apply 
changes equally to all groups, on the administrative possibilities, and the general perception of 
fairness. Financial and economic circumstances also play a role in the policy considerations. 
Transitional law should not be governed solely by legal considerations but also by policy. It is 
therefore not possible to develop mathematically applicable guidelines that create a solution for 
each specific case.38 
 
The upper house, still not satisfied with the answer, then produced its own set of criteria 
for transitional arrangements in social security. In the end, the government had to back 
down and on 18 April 2000 it formally presented the Toetsingskader overgangsrecht 
social zekerheid, 39 which includes a list of criteria to be taken into account when 
changing social security law. These criteria are grouped under the headings of: 
 
- The nature of the social security scheme involved 
- The nature and object of the changes 
- The group affected by the changes 
- Administrative considerations and enforceability 
 
The Toetsingskader shows a (mild) preference for postponing the effect of changes, as 
originally suggested in the SCOSZ’s publication. The statement submits that a step-by-
step adjustment of existing benefit rights offers a good compromise between immediate 
effect and fully respecting existing rights. Nonetheless, in some cases it is better to allow 
changes to enter into force at a later date for the entire group of beneficiaries. This is 
because it leads to uniform application of the law, legal practice is given time to adjust to 
the new situation, while at the same time legitimate expectations are not violated. The 
preference for postponed effect also applies to long term social insurance benefits when 
these operate on the basis of accrued rights, as differences between old and new cases 
should not be prolonged excessively.  
 
The legislative guidelines (Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving),40 an official publication 




3.2 Transitional social security law in practice 
 
In practice transitional measures in the field of social security are as differentiated as the 
original government position suggested. All possible approaches are adopted, sometimes 
even within the framework of a single legislative change: tailored solutions indeed. While 
it is true that most of the transitional measures are based upon the notion of postponed 
effect, there have also been different approaches. Thus in the unemployment beneftit case 
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discussed in paragraph 2.2 the abolition of the follow-up benefit (a flat rate benefit 
payable after the expiration of earnings related unemployment benefit) was given effect 
from the date the measure was officially announced, three months before the measure 
actually reached the statute book. In other words the measure applied to all persons who 
became unemployed after the date of the announcement. The government resorted to this 
tactic because it feared that a more lenient approach would lead to an avalanche of 
benefit claims prior to the date the measure entered into force. Conversely, replacement 
of the old Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (Disablement Benefits Act; 
WAO) by the Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen (Work and Income according 
to Labour Capacity Act; WIA) in 2006 fully respected the rights of the existing 
beneficiaries under the previous legislation. The introduction of the WIA was a major and 
controversial operation. Doubtless, respecting the rights of existing beneficiaries made 
the change more palatable for parliament and the groups it represents. This only goes to 
show that transitional social security law in the Netherlands is not only tailored, but 
pragmatic and, not least, political. 
 
 
4 Executive branch regulations 
 
It could be said that the preceding sections apply equally to government legislation and 
regulations, whether enacted on the basis of delegated powers or on the basis of 
discretionary powers. The latter category of rules (based on discretionary powers) are 
referred to as policy regulations (beleidsregels) and once officially published they enjoy a 
similar status to subordinate legislation.42 The Centrale Raad van Beroep, for example, 
has applied the legal certainty test to policy regulations, so that they may not be applied 
with retroactive effect.43 
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